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POLITICAL DISCONTENT IN UKRAINE* 
This article examines the sources of rapid decline of trust in major political institutions in 
Ukraine in 1996-1997. Using the United States Information Agency (USIA) data sets of 1996 and 
1997 I argue that the population's perception of government effectiveness (government perceived 
performance), market orientations, and the possibility to influence government (externalpolitical 
efficacy) are the key causes of trust in Ukraine. I analyze both time series evolution of trust and it's 
sources as well as evolution of relationships between these dimensions. I find that government 
perceived performance as well as trust are rapidly declining. I stress, on the one hand, the increas­
ing of the influence of the government perceived performance and the political efficacy on political 
trust. On the other hand, I found in my study that the influence of market orientations on political 
trust is declining. 
Introduction. The Decline of Trust in 
Ukraine 
Political discontent has become m o r e and 
m o r e ev ident i n c o n t e m p o r a r y U k r a i n e . 
Confidence in major political forces is rapidly 
declining. According to the U n i t e d States 
Information Agency (USIA) data 24.7 percent 
of the population expressed great or some trust 
in the Counci l of Ministers in 1996 (12.7 
p e r c e n t - i n 1997), 17.2 percent of the people 
expressed confidence in Par l iament in 1996 
(12.8 percent- in 1997)1. What is the relevance 
of this data? Does it really m a t t e r if political 
trust is declining? 
The substantial political discontent in the 
country may cause real prob lems for the 
stability of the regime. According to Nye [16], 
confidence a n d regime stabil i ty might be 
connected through the willingness of the public 
to provide such crucial resources as tax dollars, 
to obey the law, and the willingness of bright 
young people to go into government. Distrust 
leads to people 's reluctance to provide these 
resources. Consequently, government can not 
perform well, which, therefore, leads to further 
decline of t rus t . O n e can as sume t h a t in 
Ukraine dis trust a n d negative government 
"This work was sponsored by the Democratic Education Projekt. Data sets of "Ukrainian's Economic and 
Political Orientations" of 1997 are used in the analysis (surveys conducted by the Kiev International Institute 
of cociology at the reqest of the United States Information Agency (USIA)). 
As for other major institution decline of confidence in the year was not founded: 48.0 %t in 1996 to 47.4% 
in 1997 for Ukrainian armed forces, 17.1% in 1996 to 17.4% in 1997 for Judical system.. 
per formance lead to willingness of young 
educated people to leave the country. Those 
who are expected to improve the situation 
prefer to live outside. 
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d i s c o n t e n t i s 
connected with the decreasing support for 
democrat ic values. It is associated with 
declining part ic ipat ion and the quality of 
democracy (if it is possible to talk about 
some quality of democracy in Ukraine for 
now). " D e m o c r a c y ' s guiding ideal is the 
substitution of mutual understanding and 
agreement for coerciveness and arbitrary 
authority in all phases of social and political 
life. The existence of distrustful citizens who 
are convinces t h a t the government serves 
the interests of a few rather than the interests 
of all is a barrier to the realization of political 
ideal" [ l .p .226] . 
T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e d e c l i n e o f 
political trust for the survival of democracy 
in Ukraine leads us to question the sources 
of this decline. 
A popular psychological explanation for 
declining trust is t h a t it is connected to 
i n t e r p e r s o n a l t r u s t . H o w e v e r , " m o s t 
academic studies have found only a modest 
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relationship between interpersonal trust and 
trust in government" [17,p.84-85]. Statistics 
in Ukraine show, that mean2 level of trust in 
government in 1996 was 2.30 (2.16 in 1997), 
in Parliament in 1996 2.09 (2.03 in 1997), in 
President 2.55 in 1996 (2.28 in 1997). 
However, the level of trust in family and 
relatives was much higher (4.57 both in 1996 
and in 1997) [18]. Moreover, as I noted earlier, 
in Ukraine, the decline of trust in parliament, 
the Council of Ministers and the President is 
not followed by a decline of trust in other major 
institutions, such as army and the judicial 
system. 
Another popular explanation is connected 
with the influence of mass media. I assume 
that mass media influences political trust 
through the populat ion's perception of 
government effectiveness (government 
perceived performance). Below I try to look 
at this question more closely. 
Nye [16] examines other explanations of 
political trust employed in existing literature: 
•The scope of government. 
•Political performance. 
•Economic causes of dissatisfaction. 
•Social and cul tura l causes of 
dissatisfaction. 
•Political causes of dissatisfaction. 
I'm going to analyze the influence of three 
dimensions on trust in Ukraine: 
1. Support for transition to a free market 
as a cause of dissatisfaction based on economic 
values. 
2. Poli t ical per formance, namely, 
government perceived performance. 
3. Political efficacy. I consider one 
indicator of political efficacy, namely, the 
possibility to influence government by voting. 
My basic hypothesis is that people who 
support transition to a free market positively 
evaluate government effectiveness and feel 
that they can influence the government by 
voting are more likely to trust political 
institutions. I assume that the influences of the 
afore-mentioned factors on political trust are 
not stable in time. My purpose is to find out 
which influences are increasing, which are 
2Means were calculated for 5-ball scale of level о 
decreasing, and which remain the same. I 
also present some statistics in evolution of 
concepts under study. 
Research Methodology 
Initially I put forward several different 
hypotheses about the structure of relations 
between the concepts under study. That is 
why I used alternative models or competing 
models rather than a model testing approach. 
As a goodness-of-fit measure for my models 
I use the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) [11]. 
Political Efficacy and Trust 
There are five analytically distinct usages 
of the word "alienation" in existing literature: 
normlessness, meaningless, powerlessness, 
social isolation and self-estrangement [21]. 
The most common usage refers to feeling of 
political inefficacy (powerlessness) and 
distrust (normlessness). In my article I 
analyze these two core dimensions of 
political alienation. 
The concept of political efficacy was 
introduced into empirical research by 
Campbell, Gurin and Miller [7, see also 10] 
with the definition: "sense of political efficacy 
may be defined as the feeling that individual 
political action does have, or can have, an 
impact upon the political process that it is 
worth while to perform one's civic duties". 
In their classical work Almond and 
Verba [5] make an important distinction 
between "output effect" or "the kind of 
expectations people have of treatment at 
the hands of government officials" and 
"input effect" or "the feeling people have 
both about those agencies and processes 
that are involved in the election of public 
officials and about the enactment of general 
public policies". Thus, political efficacy is 
an input dimension; a trust is an output 
dimension. Lane [14, see also 10] made a 
distinction between two dimensions of 
citizen's attitudes towards politics: internal 
efficacy (competence) and externa l 
efficacy (responsiveness). 
"ust: 5 - great trust. 1 - no trust 
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Different models for measuring political 
efficacy are proposed in the existing literature 
[see, for example, 3, 4]. Acock, and Clark [3] 
propose political efficacy consisting of two-
constructs model with four indicators and 
measurement errors. External efficacy is 
represented by such indicators as: "How much 
attention to what people think...?" and "Over 
the years, how much attention do you feel the 
government pays to what people think when it 
decides what to do?". I'm going to analyze a 
single indicator of political efficacy: "Voting is 
an opportunity to influence government". While 
it limits my analysis, it can be seen as an 
extreme display of political inefficacy: if even 
voting can not influence government, than how 
to influence? 
In 1996, 25 percent of Ukrainians agreed 
that voting gives an opportunity to influence the 
government, in 1997, 32.2 percent agreed with 
the mentioned statement. Though dynamics is 
not substantial, it gives us an opportunity to hope 
for a better situation. People's feeling of their 
ability to influence the government is of key 
importance for a democratic state. 
Discussions of political trust start with 
Easton, who in 1979 proposed the concept of 
political support [10] which he defined as a set 
of positive attitudes to political objects. Support 
can be specific and diffuse depending upon 
whether it applies to objects or content. Political 
trust is a form of diffuse support, which may 
be focused on one or three general political 
objects: the "political community", i.e., the broad 
group of persons who share a political division 
of labor; the "regime", the basic rules of the 
game through which political power is shared; 
and finally the elected and appointed officials 
responsible for making and implementing 
political decisions [ 2]. However, "certain 
political objects may simultaneously encompass 
both incumbents and institutions to a degree that 
makes difficult for most members of the public 
to distinguish clearly between their regime and 
authority aspects" [2]. 
In my article I consider trust in several major 
political institutions: the Council of Ministers, 
the Parliament, the President, the Ukrainian 
armed forces, and the judicial system. In order 
to accumulate trust in different political 
institutions into one construct I constructed 
a two-group restricted (factor loadings are 
equal in both groups) measurement model 
with five indicators and measurement errors 
(See Appendix A). I assume, that indicators 
taken into consideration simultaneously 
encompass both incumbents and institutions. 
Support for transition to a free 
market economy in Ukraine 
According to Gabriel, "since values are 
used as standards in evaluating political 
situations and objects, a strong relationship 
can be expected between value orientations 
and feelings of trust" [10,p. 367]. Following 
this statement, I expect support for a free 
market economy to play an important role 
in citizens' evaluations of ineffectiveness of 
the government and political inefficacy. "... 
to the extent that support for market reforms 
is built on a foundation of fundamental 
beliefs, Soviet citizens are more likely to 
support these institutional changes even in 
the face of serious hardships" [9,p. 539]. In 
my research I consider support for a free 
market economy as an exogenous construct 
which influences political performance and 
external political efficacy. "A useful way to 
describe the relation between democracy 
and capi ta l ism is to say that it is 
asymmetrical. Capitalism is a necessary -
though not sufficient - condition for 
democracy but democracy is not a 
precondition for capitalism" [6,p.5]. 
Three dimensions of support for a free 
market economy are taken into 
consideration: 
1. Liberalization of prices. "Most 
economists consider the liberalization of 
prices to be an essential element of market 
reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe" [9,p. 594]. In order to estimate the 
beliefs of Ukrainians in the necessity of 
liberalization of prices I consider a five items 
agree-disagree scale for the statement: "For 
the improvement of economy in Ukraine 
prices for basic things and services have to 
be free...". 
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2. Privatization. "...Free-market reform 
includes the introduction of private ownership 
into an economy that has had limited historical 
experience with such a concept" [9,p.594]. I 
consider two indicators of attitudes towards 
privatization: (1) "Ordinary people will benefit 
from private property in Ukraine", and (2) 
"Citizens of Ukraine should have an opportunity 
to buy and sell agricultural land". 
3. Foreign investments. Finally, I assume that 
positive attitude toward foreign investments is a 
core element of free market support in Ukraine. 
Obviously, support of foreign investors can help 
the state to afford economic transformations 
towards a market economy. A five items agree-
disagree scale for the statement "Foreign 
investments should be encouraged" is used in 
my analysis to measure attitudes towards 
foreign investments. 
According to Table 1, fewer and fewer 
people in Ukraine support free prices. People 
do not feel that they are capable of withstanding 
economic difficulties and need the protection of 
the state. Nevertheless, a substantial part of the 
population (in 1997 even more then in 1996) 
continues to believe that "ordinary people will 
benefit from private property in Ukraine". The 
number of those who support foreign 
investments also increases - people hope that it 
will help to overcome an economic crisis. As 
for the private ownership of agricultural land, 
attempts to inculcate it without a complex state 
program were not successful. Private 
agricultural enterprises were not compatible. As 
a result of it, support for the opportunity to buy 
and sell agricultural land declines. 
Support for transition to 
In order to measure the construct 
"Orientations towards market economy" I 
constructed two-groups restricted measurement 
model (See Appendix B). 
As I not ed earlier, support for market 
transformation is vital, but, of course, not enough 
for tolerance toward political institutions. "The 
notion that the market by itself can efficiently 
allocate scarce resources is purely hortatory" 
[19,p. 43]. Among explanations for a seeming 
decline of confidence, "one favorite is to do with 
it scope... President Ronald Reagan is famous 
for having said that government was the problem, 
not the solution. To illustrate, he said, "We 
declared war on poverty. And poverty won!"" 
[15,p.21]. Therefore I assume that government 
perceived performance is an important factor, 
which influences political discontent. 
Government Perceived Performance 
... true leaders are those who can 
• inspire hope 
among their followers in a set of 
limited but lofty 
goals and then use that hope to build 
support 
to achieve those goals [23,p.l81]. 
Political leaders of stable states do what will 
allow them to stay in power. In other words, 
they will try to keep the support of their electorate 
and to attract those who voted for other 
candidates. On the other hand, citizens of the 
state can evaluate the effectiveness of political 
leaders by taking into account their activities and 
outcomes based on media interpretations and 
comments of friends and neighbors. 
Table 1 
a free market in Ukraine 
Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statemevts: 
For the improvement of economy in Ukraine prices 
for basic things and services have to be free... 
Ordinary people will benefit from private property 
in Ukraine... 
Foreign investments should be encouraged... 
Citizens of Ukraine should have an opportunity 
to buy and sell agricultural land... 
AGREE, % 
1996 
46,5 
34,8 
36,8 
66,7 
1997 
23,0 
41,5 
50,0 
53,0 
DISAGREE, % 
1996 
53,4 
65,2 
47,2 
33,4 
1997 
77,0 
58,5 
50,0 
47,0 
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How media interpretations can influence 
evaluation of government effectiveness is shown 
in newspaper articles from the fall of 1997: 
... Fund of State Property of Ukraine leads 
the big part of state property. And, as results 
show, very ineffectively. According to the first 
six months of the year, the half of corporate 
sector of economy was detrimental. Privatization 
was taken under the control of President Leonid 
Kuchma... Government of Valéry Pustovoitenko 
says about the necessity to improve the 
effectiveness of direction of state part in 
corporate enterprises. But branch ministries can 
not afford it any more, as for fund's servants, 
they have no relevant experience. Why does 
President need such a close control for 
privatization - is another question... [12]. 
Changes to the taxation law "prepared by the 
state have not satisfied deputies - advisor of 
Supreme Counsil Vitaly Melnychuk says. There 
are a lot of proposals to this law, because, to be 
frank, it will stop those enterprises which are 
still working" [20]. 
On the 3rd of September 1997 in the 
Parliament session concerning the questions of 
law politics and justice law reform an 
unprecedented decision for Ukraine was taken. 
Members of the Committee proposed to 
Parliament the procedure of impeachment of 
President Leonid Kuchma. Such a decision was 
caused by a situation when Parliament twice 
overruled veto of the head of the state on the 
law of local governmental administration but the 
President has not signed this law [22]. 
Pavlo Lazarenko headed the party 
"Gromada" and also started the creation of a 
shadow Cabinet [13]. 
Even such a brief and limited overview gives 
us an opportunity to assume that the influence 
of mass media in Ukraine 1997 is more likely 
negative than positive. 
Evolution of governance can be considered 
in three dimensions: the scope of government 
(what the government does), performance (how 
it is doing), and it's perceived performance (how 
it is seen by its citizens) [16]. I am analyzing 
several dimensions of perceived performance of 
the government. Following Wilson [23] I regard 
this perceived performance (subjective 
evaluation of government effectiveness) as 
political performance. I consider several 
areas of government action and public policy. 
Security issues. People expect their 
government to protect them against violence 
from both inside and outside the country. In 
order to estimate political performance in 
security issues we consider two indicators: 
evaluations of government effectiveness in 
(1) fighting organized crime; (2) providing 
defense needs. 
Fighting organized crime is of key 
importance for the survival of democracy in 
contemporary Ukraine. Increased crime and 
inability of the state to protect ordinary people 
may lead to renewed nostalgia for a strong 
state, or for a communist rule. The strategic 
geographical position of Ukraine makes the 
possibility that attempts to "set it in order" 
both by Russia and the Western states more 
realistic. In this case the main purpose of 
Ukraine would be to avoid war or to be ready 
to defend itself. 
So far citizens have evaluated the 
government's effectiveness in fighting 
organized crime negatively: 9.8 percent of the 
popula t ion evaluated government 
effectiveness in 1996 positively (7.4 percent 
in 1997); the situation with providing defense 
needs is a little bit better: 36.2 percent in 1996, 
and 44.0 percent in 1997. This can be 
explained from the point of view that the 
majority of people do not think about army 
affairs until a war breaks out. 
Another significant issue to consider is 
economic growth of the country. Stagnation, 
inflation, and increasing unemployment in 
Ukraine have marked the last few years. 
Possibilities for the growth of the private 
sector are miserable - huge taxes, and weak 
law make it difficult. Ukraine is becoming 
poorer and poorer. It is time to think about 
survival, not about economic growth. 
Consequently people evaluate government 
effectiveness in the area of economic growth 
negatively. And this evaluation becomes 
substantially more negative with time: 76.2 
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percent of the p o p u l a t i o n eva luated 
government effectiveness in promoting 
economic growth negatively; in 1997 this 
statistics became 92.8 percent. 
Successful social p r o t e c t i o n of the 
population helps to win the allegiance of less-
advantaged people who were alienated from 
the market economy and sometimes from 
democracy as a result of the harshness of early 
capitalism [23]. In Ukraine social protection 
of the population is a very problematic issue 
because it includes a large variety of issues, 
such as medical care, education, childcare 
support, housing subsidies and others. In spite 
of the wide variety of needs, the government 
can not afford substantial help to those who 
need it. It seems now that the majority of the 
U k r a i n i a n p o p u l a t i o n deserves social 
protection. According to the USIA data set 
for 1997, about 92 percent of population had 
total income per family of 300 grivnas or less. 
It is not even enough to provide sufficient 
nutrition. This is the reason why I also consider 
government effectiveness in ensuring food 
supply. In 1996 5.2 percent (2.9 percent in 
1997) of Ukrainians evaluated government 
effectiveness in social protection positively, 
30.6 percent in 1996 (45.4 percent in 1997) 
evaluated ensuring food supply positively. 
While environmental protection is an 
important issue in the politics of Ukraine, the 
government can not afford to pay attention to 
this issue. As a result, people evaluate 
government effectiveness in environmental 
protection negatively: 7.7 percent of the 
population in 1996 (6.3 percent in 1997) 
evaluated government effectiveness in 
cleaning up environmental pollution negatively. 
The protection of civil rights involves at 
least three dimensions [23]: a statement of the 
basic right to be protected in a country, 
independent courts that enforce these rights 
against abuses by individuals, and guarantees 
of civil liberties. Therefore, measurement of 
government effectiveness in this issue is 
problematic. Nevertheless, I assume that it 
provides an affective eva luat ion of 
government performance: 19.4 percent of 
Ukrainians in 1996 (7.5 percent in 1997) 
evaluate protecting civil rights in the country 
positively. 
In order to accumulate all the afore­
m e n t i o n e d aspects of government 
performance in one measure I constructed 
two-groups restricted (factor loadings are 
equal in two groups) measurement model 
(See Appendix C). 
Relations between Attitudes towards 
Free Market.Political Performance and 
Political Discontent 
It is important to find out whether people 
dissatisfied with a given decision or set of 
decisions first begin to distrust the authorities 
and finally become disenchanted with the 
political community itself. 
The hypothesis of a crucial role that 
political performance plays in support for the 
political institutions and on political efficacy 
was drawn in my study. A n o t h e r 
presumption is connected with the influence 
that support for a free market has on political 
efficacy and perceived government 
performance. Finally, political efficacy is 
assumed to influence political trust. My 
model of political discontent is similar to 
Shwartz's model of alienation. According to 
Shwartz [21,p. 16], "adoption of political 
alienation is a function of three variables: (1) 
perceived threat from value conflict; (2) 
perceived, personal, political inefficacy; and 
(3) perceived systemic inefficacy". And 
while my methods and measures differ 
substantially from Shwartz's, the main idea 
remains the same - main causes of 
discontent lie in values (in my article it is 
represented by market values), perceived 
political performance and political inefficacy. 
I constructed a two-group regression 
model which illustrates the relationships 
between market orientation, political 
performance, external political efficacy and 
pol i t ical t rus t . Models fits da ta 
(RMSEA=0.0). 
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As the above path diagram shows, regression 
coefficient for Ukraine 1996 and 1997 differ 
substantially. In order to estimate the significance 
of differences I tested the hypothesis of the 
regression coefficienr's equality for each relation 
presented in model. The results of testing are 
shown in Table 2. 
All the relations presented in the model differ 
significantly. The influences of market orienta-
tions on political performance and political 
efficacy decrease. The influences of political 
performance on political efficacy and 
confidence in political institutions and of politi-
cal efficacy on confidence in political institu-
Table.2. 
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tions increase. One can assume that the dynam­
ics have to be as follows: unsatisfactory govern­
ment performance leads to the feeling of political 
inefficacy and distrust. Inefficacy and distrust lead 
to reluctance to support government through taxes, 
and to abide by laws. Thus, political performance 
becomes worse and leads to deeper alienation. 
This influence of political performance becomes 
more substantial with time. As a whole, such a 
situation seems to be dangerous for the survival 
of democracy in Ukraine. The way out from this 
circle has to be a radical transformation of gov­
ernment policy. 
Conclusions 
Trust in major political institutions is rapidly 
declining in Ukraine. Political discontent in the 
country is vital for survival of democracy. It may 
cause real problems for the stability of regime. It 
is also connected with the decreasing support for 
democratic values. Therefore it is important to 
find the main sources of it. 
Complex social phenomena have multiple 
causes. I consider a simple model in order to 
explain the complex concept of discontent with 
political institutions. I simplify the reality in 
attempt to construct model with a few variables. 
I consider only a few of possible causes of 
discontent in Ukraine. In my study market 
orientations, government performance, and 
external efficacy have a substantial influence 
on political trust. These influences are not 
similar in time. The influences of political 
performance and external political efficacy 
increase while the influence of support for 
market decreases. I'm also trying to support my 
statistical calculations by taking into 
consideration the context of mass media of the 
time. I assume that mass media influences the 
way in which the population perceives the 
government's performance. 
Of course, my approach has a lot of 
limitations. First of all, I consider a limited 
number of factors, which influence political 
discontent. I do not take into account such 
factors as economic performance (evaluation 
of the economic situation in Ukraine), political 
interest, etc. My model does not depict the 
influences of socio-demographic factors. On 
the other hand, the single indicator "voting is a 
possibility to influence government" measures 
the external political efficacy concept (feeling 
that individual political action can have an 
impact upon the political process). However, 
despite these limitations, the results of my study 
seem obvious to me now. The weakness of 
the regime in Ukraine is so pervasive that its 
entire strength is devoted to the task of hanging 
on to power. Political leaders divert public 
resources to their own bank accounts or to their 
friends and relatives. Under such 
circumstances government performance is 
ineffective. And a key factor that is associated 
with Ukrainians' discontent is the public 
perception that government has failed in its 
efforts to solve many of the nation's most 
serious problems. 
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Appendix A 
Ukraine 1996 
Factor score regressions: 0.28("Council of Ministers): 0.13 (Parliaments 0.12ÍUkrainian Armed 
Forces); 0,17 (Judicial System); 0,14(President) 
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Appendix В 
Ukraine 1996 
Factor score regressions: 0,26 (for the improvement of economy in Ukraine prices for basic things 
have to be free...); 0,38(ordinary people eill benefit from private property in Ukraine...); 0,05 
(foreign investments should be encouraged...); 0,11 (citizens of Ukraine should have an opportunity 
to buy and sell agricultural land...) 
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Factor score regressions: 0.11 (fighting organized crime); 0,04 (ensuring food supply); 0,11 (cleaning 
up environmental pollution); 0,19 (protecting economic growth); 0,20 (protecting civil rights); 0,04 
(providing defence needs); 0,10 (social protection). 
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Lyzogub I. Political discontent in Ukraine 
Лизогуб Ірина 
ПОЛІТИЧНЕ НЕВДОВОЛЕННЯ В УКРАЇНІ 
У цій статті вивчаються причини швидкого спаду рівня довіри до основних політичних 
інститутів в Україні в період з 1996 по 1997 рік. На основі даних 1996-1997 pp. Інформаційної 
Агенції Сполучених Штатів автор стверджує, що сприйняття населенням ефективності 
уряду, ринкові орієнтації та оцінка можливості вплинути на уряд (зовнішня політична 
ефективність) є основними причинами політичної довіри в Україні. В статті аналізується як 
динаміка довіри та її причин, так і еволюція зв'язків між цими вимірами. Автор робить 
висновок про те, що рівень довіри та сприйняття ефективності уряду швидко знижуються. 
З одного боку, збільшується вплив політичної ефективності та сприйняття населенням 
ефективності дій уряду. З іншого, вплив ринкових орієнтацій зменшується. 
